summa theologica 3-4
Summa Theologica
Question: 31
OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward acts or effects of
charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of
beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?
(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?
(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?
(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Article: 1
Whether beneficence is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of
charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit
God, according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.
Objection 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making
gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act
of liberality and not of charity.
Objection 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being
due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to
justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in
this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is
either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an
act of charity.
On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated
above (Question [23], Article [1]). Now the Philosopher reckons among
the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being
beneficent, "to one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do
good to others.
I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone.
This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect
of good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above
(Question [23], Article [1]; Question [27], Article [2]). Now the will
carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so that,
consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent
to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an
act of friendship or charity.
But if the good which one man does another, be considered
under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a
special character and will belong to some special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv),
"love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns
the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the
superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to
honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to
bestow good things on us.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things must be observed in the
bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is
the inward passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs
to liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs
in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a
man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he
would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection
of his friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
Article: 2
Whether we ought to do good to all?
Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to
all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable
to do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the
good, and receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we
need not do good to all.
Objection 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor.
13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if
one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to
do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be
holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of
charity, we ought not to do good to all.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 1), beneficence
is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over
the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among
angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is
superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore,
since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should
extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all
acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do
good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one
may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity
binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in
mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a
good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all
in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the
faithful.
Reply to Objection 2: In a sinner there are two things, his
guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as
to the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for
this would be to do evil rather than good.
Reply to Objection 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the
common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents
them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of
succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they
be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like
distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.
Article: 3
Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to
those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk.
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely
united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who
are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those
who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest a
feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.
Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of
very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help
a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before
conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to
those who have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our
benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.
Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than
his children, as stated above (Question [26], Article [9]). Yet a man
ought to be more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the
children to lay up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14.
Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more
closely united to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28):
"Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly
who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of
chance are more closely united to us."
I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature,
which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such
that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all
on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is
next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness
first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him,
as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits
is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.
Now one man's connection with another may be measured in
reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together;
(thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of
fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in
spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be
conferred in various ways according to these various connections,
because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as
pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely
connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various
requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain
cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme
necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent
need.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to
invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so
that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of
charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought
rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it
must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor
those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one
be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help
rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well
as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent man.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike
than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a
man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a
private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a
whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is
one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but
rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a
man may have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either
because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or
in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what
he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless
perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take
another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,
again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in
which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed
with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into
consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases,
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down
a general rule.
The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the
goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may
be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain
moral equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no
benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from
his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give
the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other
side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other
circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In
other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit
received; and here again no general rule can laid down.
Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a
parent's love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love
tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency
it would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,
to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation
we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them,
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
Article: 4
Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue.
For precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make
men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Mt. 4:44):
"Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.
Objection 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there
are opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on
our neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
beneficence is a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, charity is not divided into several
species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence,
according to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a
distinct virtue from charity.
On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not
require different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as
external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of
goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity,
so neither is beneficence.
I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects
of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of
good, as explained above (Article [1]). Wherefore beneficence is not a
distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but
about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes
distinction, not of habits, but of acts.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our
neighbor, if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to
be traced to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of
evil, are to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things
under certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced
to certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
various kinds of benefits.
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Question: 32
OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
(2) Of the different kinds of alms;
(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?
(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?
(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?
(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?
(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?
(8) Who can give alms?
(9) To whom should we give alms?
(10) How should alms be given ?
Article: 1
Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of
charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is
possible to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3:
"If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have
not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an
act of charity.
Objection 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of
satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms."
Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act
of justice and not of charity.
Objection 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an
act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God,
according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for
by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is
not an act of charity, but of religion.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that
to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is
especially true of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: "He that hath the
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall
put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards
the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and
for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
(Question [30], Articles [1],2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is,
properly speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for
in Greek {eleemosyne} it is derived from having mercy {eleein} even as
the Latin "miseratio" is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as
shown above (Question [30], Article [2], Article [3], Objection [3]),
it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of
mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways:
first materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and
such an act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without
having the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light
of reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak
of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice
is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. with
readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the
virtue.
Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity,
but to give alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and
readiness, and altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of
one virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and
directing it to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that
almsgiving is reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity
for the one in distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin;
and in so far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of
a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so
far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise
from excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings
to them more than one ought.
Article: 2
Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds
are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds,
namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the
naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the
captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following
verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or
bury."
Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct
the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to
reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble
and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in the
following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and
to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.
And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably
enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But
a dead man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not
have spoken truly when He said (Mt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who
kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The
quotation is from Lk. 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating
the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mt.
25:35,36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article [1]), the purpose
of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many
needs of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a
blind man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor
man needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the
reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than
of mercy. Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual
almsdeeds.
Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a
defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is
ignorant of what he knows himself.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that
hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that
hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty;
let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill
and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of
speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his
talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of
the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in
respect of those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is
suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which
affect the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others
affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal
need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during
this life, it is either a common need in respect of things needed by
all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident
supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or
external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid
food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have "to feed the hungry";
while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect
of this we have "to give drink to the thirsty." The common need with
regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as
to this we have "to clothe the naked": while the other is in respect of
a dwelling place, and as to this we have "to harbor the harborless."
Again if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal
cause, like sickness, and then we have "to visit the sick," or it
results from an external cause, and then we have "to ransom the
captive." After this life we give "burial to the dead."
In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual
acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this
respect we have "prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly,
by giving human assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to
relieve a deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this
deficiency be in the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by
"instructing," and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied
by "counselling." Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of
the appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by
"comforting." Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act;
and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in
respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate
will, and thus the remedy takes the form of "reproof." Secondly, in
respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be committed
against ourselves, we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury,"
while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our
power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly,
in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the
sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his
intention; in which case the remedy is applied by "bearing with him,"
especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
Rm. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any
other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one
another's burdens."
Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as
though his body could be capable of perception after death. In this
sense Our Lord said that those who kill the body "have no more that
they can do"; and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the
dead with the other works of mercy, but those only which are more
clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is
done with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose
respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a man's
fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness which
kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that some are
praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord;
as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).
Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for
blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the
blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick.
In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose
of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special
mention of this particular need.
Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the
exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of
justice, but, as to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a
man from the evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness,
according to Prov. 27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the
deceitful kisses of an enemy."
Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only
when it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving
to supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
Article: 3
Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more
account than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an
alms to one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised
because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved
by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is
relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.
Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and
meritorious if the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says
(Lk. 14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy
neighbors who are rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now
there is always compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays
for another, profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall
be turned into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in
knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore
corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.
Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy
one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his
sides have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7):
"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now a
corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual
alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual
almsdeeds.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20)
on the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mt. 5:42): "You should
give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse
what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and
send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than
what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly." Now reproof
is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to
corporal almsdeeds.
I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds.
First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first
place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more
excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal
gift, according to Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not
My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the
spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in
looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his body,
so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to love as
himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor
is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than corporal
acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.
Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some
particular case, when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms:
for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and
as the Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is
better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in
greater want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is
better, and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him:
and it is thus in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit
and praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended,
does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.),
that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it
is with spiritual almsdeeds.
Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does
not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.
Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that
in which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in
which it rests when it is inordinate.
Article: 4
Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a
spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods
exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual
effect.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the
corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore
one ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.
Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the
effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the
greater the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary
to what we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into
the treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . .
all." Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a
man . . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."
I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three
ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have
merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's
corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their
cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and
his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold."
Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again,
they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored
by a corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the
above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the
poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their substance.
Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to
buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that
spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to
merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave
more in proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity,
whence corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
Article: 5
Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of
precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now
almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my
counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem thou
thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to
keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms.
Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is
not a matter of precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the
precepts of the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to
almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do
what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mt. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,
whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a
matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not
only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it
follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as
it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right
reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into consideration
something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the
recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he should
give of his surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth,
give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to
himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the individual, but
also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have
the expression "necessary to the person" [*The official necessities of
a person in position] taking the word "person" as expressive of
dignity). Because each one must first of all look after himself and
then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what
remains relieve the needs of others. Thus nature first, by its
nutritive power, takes what it requires for the upkeep of one's own
body, and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of another by
the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he
should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms:
yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of
all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those
who could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases
the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast
not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi,
whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to
give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is
extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter
of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject
to God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which
he did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us,
are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong
not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of
what we have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super
Luc. xii, 18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as
coming from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why
are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we
omit to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his
need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mt. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is
reduced to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the
Apostle interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*"Pietas," whence our English word
"Piety." Cf. also inf. Question [101], Article [2].]
Article: 6
Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out
of what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only
as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our
interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of
charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the
order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than his
neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he
needed, in order to succor his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself,
squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man
have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of
what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from
the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that
gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but
also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.
I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because
without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give
alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a
man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely
sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his
charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of others if he
were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say
this without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that
by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage,
and a support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy
act to endanger one's life and the lives of those who are under our
charge for the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to
be preferred to one's own.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot
without it live in keeping with his social station, as regards either
himself or those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus
is not an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's
property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might
take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the
decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is
good to give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not
of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent that
the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's
station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live
unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule.
The first is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by
entering religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for
Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself
to another state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of,
though it be required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless
easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience.
Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual,
or great need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it
would seem praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one's station, in
order to provide for a greater need.
The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
Article: 7
Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of
ill-gotten goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends
of the mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it
is lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.
Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten.
But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was
forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to
God: "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of
. . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are
ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take such
like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give." And most
of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy
Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give
alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than
lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property
than to commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor
one who is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who
says (Cf. Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are
taken): "Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou
hast slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms
of ill-gotten goods.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give
alms from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge,
not to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from
interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the
Body of Christ."
I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the
first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom
it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained
possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of
such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.
Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may
not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he
received it, because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it
unjustly. This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver
contravene the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be
made not to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all
similar cases of illegal giving and receiving.
Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was
unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in
the case of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre
properly so called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and
against the Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or
unlawfully in taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and
to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some
have misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's
property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are
fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be
amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De
Quaest. Ev. ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for those who
are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according
to Ambrose in his commentary on Lk. 16:9, "Make unto yourselves
friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws our
affections by the various allurements of wealth." Or, because "among
the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one who took
the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing about it,"
as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are
styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality," because they are
not distributed equally among all, one being in need, and another in
affluence.
Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be
given out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were
not made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and
through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out
of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to
the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and
wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution,
and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there
would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil
law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil
law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and
moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such
as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains,
unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from
one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to
restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and
yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive
law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in
alms.
Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case
of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take
another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who
is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something
if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If
however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's
consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.
Article: 8
Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power
can give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to
whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to
give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as
Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to
ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8:
"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The
sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by
all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.
Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn.
3:16). But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner;
hence it is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the
knowledge of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of
the Romans were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no
longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] Therefore
a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's
power.
Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their
parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1):
"Children, obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children
may give alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own,
since they are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some
bodily use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so
as to profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power
can give alms.
Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master's power,
according to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their
masters." Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their
masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for
them. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.
On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another's
property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his
own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who
are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another's
property. Therefore those who are under another's power cannot give
alms.
I answer that, Anyone who is under another's power must, as
such, be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the
natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to
its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is
subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the
superior's permission.
Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give
alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to that other,
except in so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he
has something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being
commissioned by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his
monaster, in accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has
no such dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give
alms without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does
it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De
Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's property to the
poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in
order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with
Christ."
Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her
dowry which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that
property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means,
can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's
permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too
much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms
without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases
of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in
matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also
to the father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such
small quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular
property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth
Objection is clear.
Article: 9
Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to
those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written
(Ecclus. 12:4,6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . .
Do good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens
sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and
ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to
others.
Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive
an eternal reward in return, according to Mt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who
seeth in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained
chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk.
16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you
shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which
passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor
them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy
persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But
a man cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not
bound to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it
falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those
who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter we must
employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection,
holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much
holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common
weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on
our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such,
that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting
his nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive
an eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in
this respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the
order of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we
should, in preference, help those who are more closely connected with
us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in
need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family,
who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly, almsdeeds
deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient,
who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking.
Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just
as a man does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind
of comparison, as stated above (Question [30], Articles [1],2), so too,
properly speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in
another's person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he
can take something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as
when he gives to others.
Article: 10
Whether alms should be given in abundance?
Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in
abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most
closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a
way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We
should not lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it
out by degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore
alms should not be given in abundance.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that
others should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working
themselves, "and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be
the result if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to
give alms abundantly.
On the contrary, It is written (Tobias 4:93): "If thou have much, give abundantly."
I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation
either to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver,
when that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To
give thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended
the widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she
had." Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid
down when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (Article
[9]).
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in
two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense
it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more
than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to
give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor.
13:3): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which words
a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and
to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient.
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of
alms on the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish
a man to lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his
state of life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus
who slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no
household cares might keep him back" (3 Kgs. 19:21).
Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that
others should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms
which surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms
not that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account
of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily
nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De
Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should take into
consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which
proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from
riches to indigence through no fault of his own."
With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened,"
they refer to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says
on the same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to
give in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes
them so to give that they lack not for themselves."
Question: 33
OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?
(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?
(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?
(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected?
(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?
(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
Article: 1
Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an
act of charity. For a gloss on Mt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of zeal
for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret
admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of
prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi,
5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
prudence.
Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same
virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to
Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the
law of Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that
the correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with
him, is not an act of charity.
On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual
almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Question
[32], Article [1]). Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.
I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which
should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be
considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly
as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or
by being detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is
disturbed by that man's sin.
Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one
which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's good
is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which
pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of
a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin
to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore
fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a
bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is
another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer,
considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good.
This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard
the rectitude of justice between one man and another.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction
which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction,
then it takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state
further on (Question [58], Article [5]), in which sense again all "sin
is iniquity" (1 Jn. 3:4), through being contrary to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which
things counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by
prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of
some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs
chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue
commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which
executes and directs the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to
forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a
man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him,
and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives
to make him do better.
Article: 2
Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept,
according to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]:
"Accursed be he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible."
Now it is written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no
man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction
is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are
reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does
not come under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a
mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual
men are found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those of high
position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,
not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is
something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of
precept, it is due to our brethren that we correct them when they sin.
Now when a man owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum
of money, he must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he
should seek him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have
to go seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might
correct them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the
great number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not
suffice, and because religious would have to leave the cloister in
order to reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal
correction is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You
become worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this
would not be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some
precept. Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.
I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We
must observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law
forbid sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now
sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter
how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature
they are connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6:
wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other
hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due
circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous;
namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And
since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the
formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a
virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good
of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous
act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary
to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act
be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not
perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from
the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much
from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction
is directed to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we
have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.
Reply to Objection 1: In all good deeds man's action is not
efficacious without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is
in his power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we
ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question [32], Article
[5], ad 4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor
are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents.
Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.
First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to
correct someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man
refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a
suitable time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so,
they may become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith,
others who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and
virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be
counselled by charity."
Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a
way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the
same passage) "one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer
grievous pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so
dominated by such things, that it gives them the preference to
fraternal charity." This would seem to be the case when a man reckons
that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits
to do so, through fear or covetousness.
Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through
fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults,
and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could
withdraw him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through
fear or covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal
charity to these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit
to correct wrongdoers.
Reply to Objection 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to
some fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual
good, without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps
to find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should
seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he
that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to
seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr.
Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this
reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be
listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the
lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else
we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the
saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in
the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It is evident from this
that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to
rebuke evil-doers.
Article: 3
Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?
Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.
Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms.
Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction
belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e.
to prelates.
Objection 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him
by his rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the
inferior is moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue
also, which follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone
to correct inferiors.
On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam
Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be
most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may either
correct their sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off
from the Church."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), correction is
twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the
recovery of an erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like
correction belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.
But there is another correction which is an act of justice
purposing the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's
brother, but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may,
through fear, desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to
prelates, whose business it is not only to admonish, but also to
correct by means of punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction
which is common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow
temporal favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so
too ought he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching
and the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care."
Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction
concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to
give corporal assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is
gifted with a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's
wrong-doing, is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the physical order certain things
act mutually on one another, through being in some respect higher than
one another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in
potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can correct
another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the
other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
Article: 4
Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his
prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch the
mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the mount,
dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kgs. 6:7) it is related that the Lord
struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our
prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to
the face," adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal
to his prelate, he ought not to correct him.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one
ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one
thinks better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself
than of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not
only to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position
among you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction is
a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.
I answer that, A subject is not competent to administer to his
prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive
nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of
charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of any person
towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something in
that person which requires correction.
Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to
whatever is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus
vision extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since,
however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it
follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in
a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with
gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An
ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore
Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking
a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.
Reply to Objection 1: It would seem that a subject touches his
prelate inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when
he speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of
those who touched the mount and the ark.
Reply to Objection 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the
mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood
Peter then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense
of the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)
tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy
ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be
observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's
subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of
scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.
2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they
should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain
to be reproved by their subjects."
Reply to Objection 3: To presume oneself to be simply better
than one's prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but
there is no presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect,
because, in this life, no man is without some fault. We must also
remember that when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not
follow that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his
help to one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore
in greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
Article: 5
Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a
wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having
committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as
stated above (Article [2]). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to
forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has committed
a sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account
than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain
from administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on
account of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that
we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a
sin, a man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none
to reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:
therefore the former is also.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that
is subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
written (Rm. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [3], ad 2), to correct a
wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with
right judgment. Now sin, as stated above (FS, Question [85], Articles
[1],2), does not destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the
sinner's reason of all right judgment, and in this respect he may be
competent to find fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a
previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for
three reasons. First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy
to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for
a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says
on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?" etc. (Mt. 7:3): "He is
speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin,
have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren."
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on
account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin
be well known, because it would seem that he corrects, not out of
charity, but more for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Mt.
7:4, "How sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom
[*Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] thus: "That is---'With what object?' Out of charity, think
you, that you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look
after your own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others,
but to hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be
praised by men for your knowledge."
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for
instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart,
sets himself above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh
severity, as though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the
duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his
rebuke is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we
should think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must
remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we
once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we
should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our
reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find
that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan
with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows from this that,
if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor
does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although thereby he
proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother's or in
his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
Article: 6
Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from
correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is
weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O Lord,
for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease
to take care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because
then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more,
therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.
Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not
to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept,
as stated above (Article [2]), it seems that it should not be foregone
for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rm. 3:8) we
should not do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner,
good should not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction
is a good thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the
person corrected become worse.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a
scorner lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear
lest the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear
in mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore
one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make
a man worse.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]) the correction of
the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is
directed to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should
not be omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if
he is unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made
to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,
the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice
is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of.
Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation
against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his friends.
The other fraternal correction is directed to the
amendment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely
admonishes. Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner
will not take the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal
correction should be foregone, because the means should be regulated
according to the requirements of the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman,
who is unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared
with the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power,
but not with simple fraternal correction.
Reply to Objection 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of
precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous
act in so far as it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever
it is a hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse
through it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is directed to end, becomes good
through being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction
hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer
good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted
lest evil should befall.
Article: 7
Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede denunciation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal
correction does not demand that a private admonition should precede
denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow the
example of God, according to Eph. 5:1,2: "Be ye followers of God, as
most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes punishes a man
for a sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems
that there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv),
we learn from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the
commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that
a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in
private. Thus we read (Gn. 37:2) that "Joseph accused his brethren to
his father of a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4,9) that Peter
publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly "by fraud kept
back the price of the land," without beforehand admonishing them in
private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before
denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not require that secret
admonition should precede public denunciation.
Objection 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to
denounce. Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly,
without previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the
Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else
need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound by
Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect
of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself,
if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as
the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems
that the precept does not require that a secret admonition should
precede public denunciation.
Objection 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs
observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of
Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or
that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore
it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.
Objection 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their
prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or
someone in particular, to tell him if they know of anything that
requires correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to
tell them this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the
precept does not require secret admonition before public denunciation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the
words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Mt. 18:15): "Aiming at
his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he
might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a
better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept of charity
to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of
fraternal correction comes under the precept.
I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it
is necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public
or secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only
for the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who
know of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins
should be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle
(1 Tim. 5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also
may have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins,
as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).
On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words
of Our Lord seem to apply (Mt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of
others, he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others
whom he 'disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense
even at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further
distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either
in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly
to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns
other men away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret,
sins not only against you in particular, but also against others, it is
necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent
him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that
this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the
other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and
the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the
sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our
one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the
physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible,
without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a
limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the
whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if
possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good
name.
For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner
himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many
losses, if he lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters,
because many are restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so
that when a man finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning.
Hence Jerome says on Mt. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst
rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once
become shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our
sinning brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to
the dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad
pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for
holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done anything
wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it believed of
all": and also because when one man's sin is made public others are
incited to sin likewise.
Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a
good name, Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother
and so deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit
his good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a
secret admonition to precede public denunciation.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God,
wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins
are to the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners
sometimes by secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward
inspiration, either while they wake or while they sleep, according to
Job 33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth
upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching
instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man
from the things he is doing."
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as
though it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once.
Yet He did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure.
The sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his
brethren."
Reply to Objection 3: When there is danger to a great number of
people, those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother
does not sin against thee alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of
religious are about little faults which do not affect a man's good
name, wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than
accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a
nature as to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to
Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.
Reply to Objection 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to
a Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather
then men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him
anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly
understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal
correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to
some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to
issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our
Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed,
because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is,
wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden
matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs,
as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command
just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man
under oath to tell the truth.
Article: 8
Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?
Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to
be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his
brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a
brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought
not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.
Objection 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself.
Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither
therefore ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin
of our brother.
Objection 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove
something. But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore
it is useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before
bringing it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before
the superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is
to tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 18:16): "Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc.
I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another
is to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning
of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another
between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be
public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently
it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between
the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin be indicated to a
few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be
amended without dishonoring him before the public.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the order of
fraternal correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our
brother secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen
not, and his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no
further in the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the
ears of several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter,
according to Our Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine
says in his Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it
"will cause a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say
otherwise that when the secret admonition has been given once or
several times, as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we
must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to
judge with any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail,
we must take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call
witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not
conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become worse:
because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting
him, as stated above (Article [6]).
Reply to Objection 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend
his own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's
sin. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: There may be three reasons for citing
witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome
says: secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as
Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly, "to prove that the man who
rebuked his brother, has done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom.
in Matth. lx).
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to
be made known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in
so far as the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more
use than others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church,
i.e. as holding the position of judge.
Question: 34
OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1)
hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed
to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to
peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and
fraternal correction.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?
(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?
(5) Whether it is a capital sin?
(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
Article: 1
Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an
object of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty
itself. Therefore He is hated by none.
Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras
4:36,[39] it is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all
men) do well like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to
Jn. 14:6. Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself.
Therefore none can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them
that hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they
have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."
I answer that, As shown above (FS, Question [29], Article [1]),
hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in
motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man
in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence;
secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God .
. . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made"
(Rm. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can
hate---for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible
for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise
be contrary to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand,"
which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore
again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the
Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are
contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment,
and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are
repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of
them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look
upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is
apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of
all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far
as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are,
tend to be like God, Who is Being itself.
Article: 2
Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the
greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy
Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mt. 12:32. Now hatred
of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Question [14],
Article [2]). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from
God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be
further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God,
nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is
graver than the sin of hatred against God.
Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason
of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of
which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous
sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the
love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is
man's worst sin.
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from
God, as stated above (Question [10], Article [3]): and this aversion
would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the
nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied
in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and
indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so
does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his
will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication
for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly,
in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which
aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always
takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of
God is more grievous than other sins.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it
is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of
good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another
to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all
good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against
the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a
special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind
of that sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be
voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful.
Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and
hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a
greater sin than unbelief.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment,
hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments
inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence
for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God
commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other
hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those
punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most grievous
sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more
grievous to love sin than to |