Question: 31 OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning
delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The
causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;
(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
Article: 1
Whether delight is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion,
and says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while
passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight
is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated
in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in
having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore
delight is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the
one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in
Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or
in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5.
Therefore delight is not a passion.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq)
reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are
properly called passions, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]).
Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement
of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight,
since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain
movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once,
in keeping with the nature of the thing."
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as
in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections,
so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection
does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection
does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals
and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the
state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals
do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the
soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.
Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we
designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping
with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we
assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By
saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this
establishing is to be understood not as in the process of
establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the
term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as
Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in
Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible,"
we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no
delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of
the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a
passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered,
is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when
a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered
operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as
observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation,
we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an
animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to
the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs
to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases,
by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive
faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it
had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For
though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the
presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite,
nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its
object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more
appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil
tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the
soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated
above (Question [23], Articles [1],4): and in this sense delight is
called a passion.
Article: 2
Whether delight is in time?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight
is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be
morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose.
Therefore pleasure is in time.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same
genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is
too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by
itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it
were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things
are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something
pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose,
speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in
time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which
succession is not essential, but which are subject to something
successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something
successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or
change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is
subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed,
is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it
were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to
change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it
be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time,
either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is
twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something
existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is
in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of
something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will
and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive,
nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a
good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement
of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs
more to delight not to be in time.
Article: 3
Whether delight differs from joy?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same
as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their
objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good
obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms.
But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that
there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ
from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals;
whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same
as delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind
of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated
above (Question [30], Article [3]), so also some delights are natural,
and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it,
"some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to
the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire
naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a
result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight
follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but
only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object
of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently
whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in
rational beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy;
since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without
rejoicing thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends
to more things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the
soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a
way, to diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are
also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not
called otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences (Question [30], Article [3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in
concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence,
while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to
concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose
corresponding to the difference of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight
are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is
derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say
"latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward
delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks
forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain
special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to
belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational
beings.
Article: 4
Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the
intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that
"delight is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an
intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual
appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is
in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the
irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power
which we have in common with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the
Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the
intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual
appetite.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]), a certain delight
arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason
apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as
regards its application to some particular thing, but also the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the
intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called
joy, but not bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either
power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a
bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is
nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition
of consent to the things we wish."
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he
uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of
perception. For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon
every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and
contemplation." Or we may say that he is defining delight of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion,
properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not
thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement:
for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius
says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible
to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the
gladness of incorruption."
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common
with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius
says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic
delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive
appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the
intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.
Article: 5
Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures
are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek
some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more
seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its
effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter
the state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3).
Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and
checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to
check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy
words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher
says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the
operation of wisdom."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), pleasure arises
from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the
operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual
soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward
matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand,
to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward
matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed;
for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved"
(Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and
intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are
known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure
arise, and not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with
sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for
instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt
intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For
man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it,
than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because
intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known,
since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does.
Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one
who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual
vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in
De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared
with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely
speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the
consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good
which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and
the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even
the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which
is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more
noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction
is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because
the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the
intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the
sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act:
wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some
part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward
to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and
in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement:
hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm;
because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass
away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are
more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are
more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various
griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding
griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed
more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we
shall state farther on (Question [35], Article [5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures
is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and,
again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow
and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,
which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to
seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from
bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive
appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the
sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to
be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the
mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both
sober and moderate.
Article: 6
Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not
greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the
greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end.
But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words
of Tobias 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in
darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure
afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he
loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses
the sight is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest
pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for
the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the
cause of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be
afforded by sight.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [25], Article [2], ad
1; Question [27], Article [4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure
according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses
are loved for two reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account
of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these
ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as
something good, it follows that the former pleasures of the senses,
i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas
pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to
all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which
reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater
pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that
sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest
pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible
things is gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's
nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to
this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which
are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being
more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals
which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness,
derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the
sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the
smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel
pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest
in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the
greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two,
he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking,
greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within
the limits of sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in
everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these
pleasures of the touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those
of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we
consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the
mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as
intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above (Article [3]),
denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the
sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.
Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of
knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is
stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way;
the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded
by the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the
sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which
a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the
lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him
to love it and to seek its delight.
Article: 7
Whether any pleasure is not natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For
pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But
the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural
place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which
is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
pleasure is non-natural.
Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But
"whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing
which is unnatural can give pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own
nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the
Philosopher's definition quoted above (Article [1]). But it is natural
to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural
movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in
accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can
be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the
principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own
specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called
natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in
respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take
pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue.
Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as
denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that
part of man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which
pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the
individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the
species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural
pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find some that are "not
natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For
it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of
the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary to the
specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus
it is natural to this hot water to give heat. Consequently it happens
that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason,
or in regard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural to
this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of
nature in him. And this corruption may be either on the part of the
body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet
things seem bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus
some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on the
part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or
in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things,
which are not in accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
Article: 8
Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary
to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good.
Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to
evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one
pleasure is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is
proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another,
this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give
pleasure. But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a
difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no
contrariety between one pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one
another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But
some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore
some pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened
to repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Question [23], Article
[4]). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in
contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose
in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of
the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the
former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water.
And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is
impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that
virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i.e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is
likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something
suitable and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent
repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just
as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite.
Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body,
and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6.
Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to
sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure,
since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but
also a formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be
different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific
difference in acts and passions, as stated above (Question [23],
Articles [1],4; Question [30], Article [2]).
Question: 32 OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?
(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?
(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Article: 1
Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and
first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above (Question [31], Article [1]).
But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations
themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end
gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not
always an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation.
Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from
work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore
operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4)
that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation."
I answer that, As stated above (Question [31], Article [1]), two
things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the
suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these
consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an
operation; and the attainment of the suitable good is by means of an
operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good.
Wherefore every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not
pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge
alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain
things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man
takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or
the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended
as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the
effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so
far as possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they
are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power
is finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
Article: 2
Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of
pleasure. Because, as stated above (Question [31], Article [1]), the
good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of
pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure
is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing
already in existence. Now that which is being moved towards something
has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard,
forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as
stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and
fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and
fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not
a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation,
which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed
to, are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore
movement is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means
this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and
some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that
this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two,
i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to
him; and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in
respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure
are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is
changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time
is not suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable
to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing
good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued
action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person
remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural
mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the
continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's
natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On
the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man
desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing
cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is
pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the
whole be perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou
wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may
come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up
of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please
collectively more than they do severally, if all could be perceived
collectively."
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is
unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the
continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole
object of its delight at once---to such a one change will afford no
delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they
capable of being continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not
yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning
to have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it
exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure,
but by removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so
far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But
the movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from
custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural
mode of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus
from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become
pleasant.
Article: 3
Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent:
since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory
and hope do not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of
contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope
that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause
pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in
regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not
be assigned as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; and (Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted."
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable
good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is
present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the
thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in
reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any
kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real
conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the
conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than
potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which
arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible
object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there
is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but
also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable
object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has
only the conjunction of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things
which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a
fashion, present, i.e. either according to apprehension only; or
according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of
attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in
different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as
it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause
pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover,
since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved.
In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that
desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope,
as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that
is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in
preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to
memory, which is of that which has already passed away.
Article: 4
Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure.
For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to
pleasure. Therefore it does not cause it.
Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But
pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things,
when remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to
love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about,
as stated above (Question [29], Article [2]). Therefore sadness does
not cause pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been
my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of
pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.
I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as
existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways
sadness can cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing,
causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the
absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives
pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on
account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is
looked upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he
has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much
reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31
[*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad
things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without
feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph."
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the
cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat,"
as stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental
cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of
something pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause
pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant
things; but in so far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the
recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may
cause sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of
love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in
hating one and the same thing.
Article: 5
Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?
Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a
cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good
when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to
us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.
Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the
same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which
is evidently untrue.
Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from
an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must
reckon the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a
habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed from
habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the
agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to
the agents themselves.
On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle
of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children
walking in truth."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]; Question [31],
Article [1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the
attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having obtained
it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three
ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some good through the action
of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to
us, are pleasing to us: since it is pleasant to be benefited by
another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know
or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men take pleasure in
being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become
aware of some good existing in themselves. And since this appreciation
receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence
men take greater pleasure in being praised and honored by them. And
because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing
to some. And as love is for something good, while admiration is for
something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others,
inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness,
through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that
another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by
reason of the power of love, which makes a man to regard his friend as
one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon
another's good as being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an
enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6)
that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth."
Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me,
either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the
second way; or by affection, as in the third way.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not
proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me
something that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a
habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to
me by love.
Article: 6
Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a
cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's
proper good, as stated above (Articles [1],5; Question [31], Article
[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending
of one's proper good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness
rather than of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a
mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of
illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes
pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x,
4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary
causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing,
such as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be
angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11).
Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than
pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is
most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers."
I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three
ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good
conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united
to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take
pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in
our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man,
from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either
from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in
consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can
give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty
of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to another becomes
pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant
good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share.
Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works,
as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good. Another
principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which
doing good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man
takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is the motive:
for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to
someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because
love is the principal cause of pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth
one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a
cause of sadness; for instance when it is excessive.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending,
which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish,
give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to
one's own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For
it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to
appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which
there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in
so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can
give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be
wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove
and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one
does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It
is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself
to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous
hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted
thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be
of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant,
except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good.
Article: 7
Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of
pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain
unlikeness. But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and
presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather
than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than
sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek
pleasures, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore
unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain
delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is
satiated with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated
(Question [27], Article [3]): and love is the cause of pleasure.
Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure.
I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is
like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love,
as stated above (Question [27], Article [3]). And if that which is like
us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable
simply; for instance one man in respect of another, one youth in
relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus
accidentally it causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one
with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.
Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful
to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a
kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is
conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any
bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary
to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because
they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or
profits, which he seeks as his own good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion
with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this
likeness is conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and
presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they
belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being
that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is
that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is
pleasant.
Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful
man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is
sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the
sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as
it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures,
which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than
intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall
state later on (Question [35], Article [5]). And this explains why all
animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through
sense and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined
to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are
subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a
strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because his
"body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain
fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper
good, and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being
contrary to the proper good of man.
Article: 8
Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of
pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the
nature of something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than
ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being
as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning
of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know,
than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7):
since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in
the former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is
unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders
rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is
accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are
pleasant. But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says
(Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of
pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated
above (Question [23], Article [4]): and therefore the greater the
desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is
attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings with it an increase
of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that
which is loved, since it was stated above (Article [3], ad 3) that
desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind
of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an
effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his
knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause
of pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge
which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is
pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations of
things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise
to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another,
because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and
connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This
again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger,
because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it
implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning
the cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e.
that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to
another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.]
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the
good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it
is more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things
for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to
do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things
that are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards
knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them,
in so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact
that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things
that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation
causes more perfect pleasure.
Question: 33 OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Article: 1
Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of
pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the
Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written
(Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is
exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love.
Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to
receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something
not yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather
than to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But
contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that
which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in
regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain
to pleasure.
On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is.
60:5): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be
enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as
being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above (Question
[31], Article [3], ad 3).
I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily
magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save
metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards
breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things
requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive
power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good.
As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a
certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in
this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by
pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the
appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests
therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered
itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing
hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different
things according to different likenesses. And in this way expansion
pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the
affection of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only
for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other
hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more
ample in itself so as to become more capacious.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion
arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion
increases at the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind
surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking
pleasure in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since
pleasure is the end of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it
fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to
it that he may enjoy it perfectly.
Article: 2
Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire
for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as
stated above (Question [23], Article [4]; Question [25], Article [2]).
Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached.
Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But
pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object:
since desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas
pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does
not cause desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh
of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine
(Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst,
or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a
craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding
distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of
itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally;
provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing
not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in
respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is
actually present is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the
part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the
part of the thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed
not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to
possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of
a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst
for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of
this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the
table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses
a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly,
but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a
faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight
sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst."
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand
the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more
than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for
themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of
their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are
increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case
of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point
of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes
desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not
exceed the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their
point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest
delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of
contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers,
which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may
understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet
thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight
in Him, it is written (1 Pt. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him."
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in
reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural
tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man
returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced the
pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the
memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for
instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to
repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending
to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is
possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed.
Consequently it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same
time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above.
Article: 3
Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use
of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it
helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject
though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is
in the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the
apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems
to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power
moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of
pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence."
I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate
pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other
sources are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain
pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes
pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not
hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive
in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.
On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of
reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we
have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when
the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and
thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the
use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else
it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason.
Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are
contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says
that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the
speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance
that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right
angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates.
Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is
followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the
other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently
affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such
bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the
case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of
the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes
contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies
alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of
apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul.
Consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it
is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.
Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of
the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised
through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the
use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the
other sensitive powers.
Article: 4
Whether pleasure perfects operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect
operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But
pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated above (Article [3]).
Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.
Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But
pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its
essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.
Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so
either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because
operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the
reverse, as stated above (Question [4], Article [2]): nor as agent,
because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as
form, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure
does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure does
not perfect operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation."
I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First,
as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which
a thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and
completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end
added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is
operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the
repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as
agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy,
but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent,
through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it,
and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in
Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and
hinder those that are not appropriate."
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the
act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the
act of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act
is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from
the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be
causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final
cause. And in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure,
while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated
above.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.
Question: 34 OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?
(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?
(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?
Article: 1
Whether every pleasure is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that
which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil
in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and
hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is
greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of
all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic.
vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen,
Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, the
presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet
that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure is evil in itself;
and consequently every pleasure is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the
man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind
of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb
animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who
is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in
themselves and should be avoided.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the
difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to
pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not something good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the
Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems
that not every pleasure is evil.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained
that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took
account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest;
since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily
pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to
immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since
none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who
teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking
pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the
example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their
words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of
great weight, example moves more than words.
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and
that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in
some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign
a twofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the
good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the
moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated
above (Question [18], Article [5]): just as in the order of nature, a
thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural,
if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a
certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with
its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again
an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with
its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral
order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite
rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure,
whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and
the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions,
some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to
actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede
them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are
good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good
actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question [33], Article
[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that
hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such
as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as
stated above (Question [33], Article [3]), either by contrariety of the
appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the
pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal
intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it
hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily
change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither
is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken
according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason
be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that although this
fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse
has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet
it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our
first parent; because, as stated in the FP, Question [98], Article [2]
the case was different in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all
pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The
fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that
all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural
appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of
good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further
on (Question [57], Article [3]). But actions and passions, which are
within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art.
Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of
cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.
Article: 2
Whether every pleasure is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because
as stated in the FP, Question [5], Article [6] there are three kinds of
good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything
virtuous is good; and in like manner everything useful is good.
Therefore also every pleasure is good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of
something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But
pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems
absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is
good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in
itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is
good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be
good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in
Ethic. i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children
and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and
consequently all pleasure is good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."
I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all
pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in
itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have
thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good
simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.
That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not
good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways.
In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in
which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is
sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are
not suitable simply to the human temperament. In another way, through
something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the
repose of the appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that
which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good
simply. But if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not
simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will
not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good
simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.
Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on
accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful,
without being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the
appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from
reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral
order which depends on the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for
the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the
end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except
in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too
with regard to pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way
as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in
good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is
of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and
verily good.
Article: 3
Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest
good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation
cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation:
for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being
established in its own nature, as stated above (Question [31], Article
[1]). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be
made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is
universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of
itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally.
But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above (Article [2]).
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the
end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is
written (Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance;
at Thy right hand are delights even to the end."
I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted
that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained
that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some
evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But,
judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because,
from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain
movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating and the
like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and
movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement are the acts of
something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature
of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as
regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in
the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders,
as stated above (Question [32], Article [8], ad 2); but also in the act
of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.
Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that
which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from,
and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme
Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now
the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated
above (Question [1], Article [8]; Question [2], Article [7]) is
twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the
miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly,
man's last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good
simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in
the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said
to be the greatest among human goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a
"becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as
stated above. Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the
greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good
simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no
addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is
universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of
another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something
extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as
stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due
not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is
perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every
pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science
is supremely good, but not every science is.
Article: 4
Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or
rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is
the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the
first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence
that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is
more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice
of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher
of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the
will, as stated above (Question [20], Article [1]); and it is chiefly
from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the
end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of
the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore
man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of
the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure
in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil
works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are
not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally
pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But
the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with
reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the
order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the
end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle,
which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of
their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this
respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good,
whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests
in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its
end, as stated above (Question [33], Article [4]); an operation cannot
be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the
goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the
goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
Question: 35 OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which
we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its
effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
Article: 1
Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the
soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in
the body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain
is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul,
by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain
is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but
rather to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in
being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of
the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain
among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733):
"hence wild desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human
tears." [Translation: Conington.]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure;
namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so
also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some
evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the FP, Question [103], Articles [1],3. Since
then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the
same subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the
intellective or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a
passion, as stated above (Question [22], Articles [1],3): and
especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain,
according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a
passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called
passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting
Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of
pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body.
But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot
feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm
87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as
though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses
are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the
goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural
appetite, but because nature desires something as good, the removal of
which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the
sensitive appetite.
Article: 2
Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express
bodily suffering." But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul.
Therefore sorrow is not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil.
But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the
sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore
sorrow is not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 9:2): "I have great
sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my
heart," thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold
apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and
from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination.
Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above (Question [31], Article [3]): and in like
manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is
called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of
the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is
present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present,
past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and
future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external
sense, can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not
only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but also in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects
of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive
power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are
subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a
perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other
senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in
them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses,
we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural
pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if
pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning,
then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of
interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the
objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be
taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.
Article: 3
Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to
pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But
sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Mt. 5:5):
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore
they are not contrary to one another.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the
other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and
(Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes
pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the
other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be
the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The
penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The
Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil
man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure and pain are
not contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy
is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is
the volition of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent
and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary
to one another.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4),
contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or
species of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term.
Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz.
present good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows
that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the
other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In
one way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at
the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something
pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a
drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far
as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these
ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the
future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or
for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In like
manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits
in order to obtain it.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable
accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in
stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one's
memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence
gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and
whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our
love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from
pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we
perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there
represented.
Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their
own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are
considered under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be
the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but
accidentally: that is, in so far as either of them is considered under
the aspect of good or evil.
Article: 4
Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all
pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species
of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's
passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one
another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to
the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another.
But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from
Ethic. x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries.
But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from
the same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them
that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rm. 12:15). Therefore
not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific.
Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as
virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and
injustice.
Now we must observe that some things are specified by
absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and
movements, which derive their species from their terms or objects.
Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it
happens that species contained under contrary genera are not contrary
as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have
any affinity or fittingness to one another. For intemperance and
justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not
contrary to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet
they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand,
in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic,
it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not
contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual
affinity or fittingness. The reason of this is that where there is one
same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach
to a white thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries;
whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain
likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to
something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction,
which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in
affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. "white" and "non-white";
while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one
contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to say "black" and
"not white."
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by
their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary
to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of
"avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial
are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure
in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one
another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not
contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another,
but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend,
and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be
contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only
specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness
and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their
species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and
sorrow do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated
in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of
matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are
generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the
subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of
pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting
what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore
on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of
sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but
chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or
we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to
every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
Article: 5
Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor.
7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast
unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose
act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De
Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure
of contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If
therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the
object of sorr |
