Summa Theologica
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Question: 21 OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the consequences of human actions
by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?
(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?
(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?
(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?
Article: 1
Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or
sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of
nature" (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things
engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced
according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according
to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of
its being inordinate and evil.
Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in
nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained.
But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on
the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems
that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it
sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this
is false: since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil.
Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
On the contrary, As shown above (Question [19], Article [4]),
the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law:
and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the
Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in
opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by
reason of its being evil.
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is
good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is
an evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is
measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this
rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the
proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the
Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end,
according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that
action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it
is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has been said
(Question [19], Articles [3],4) that every voluntary action that turns
aside from the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and
that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law.
Hence it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of
its being good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in
respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing
generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end
whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner,
the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is
the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate
end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very
intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention
may be right or sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its
action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to
the end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment
regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the FP, Question
[48], Article [5], ad 4; Article [6], ad 3.
Article: 2
Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve
praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens
even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things
are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human
action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful;
and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its
being good.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so
does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys.
ii, 8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to
give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making
something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a
good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither
is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is
evil.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is
"weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or
diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from
being evil.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that
"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue
deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because
"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
(Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore
a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so
is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve
praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise
or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or
goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it
is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through
his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear
above (Question [1], Articles [1],2). Hence it follows that good or
evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or
blame: and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the
same thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of
the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And,
therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to
the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason
is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason:
whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all
human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end.
Since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated
above (Article [1]), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art.
First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist:
and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist
produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or
produce something good, while intending to produce something bad.
Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then
he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so
in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is not
proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former
sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is
blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take
into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human
life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of
reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for
such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is
preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence
directs, "he is the reverse."
Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils,
is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor
diminishes guilt.
Article: 3
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not
meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For
we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no
place save in matters relating to another person. But good or evil
actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to
the person of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action
is meritorious or demeritorious.
Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for
doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man
destroys what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had
destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own
actions. Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through
putting his action to a good or evil purpose.
Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he
does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and
the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good
and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a
good or an evil deed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just
man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to
the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him."
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according
to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something
to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that
every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the
member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the
hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to
another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in
his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of
the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man
ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society,
retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that
which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is
retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community,
forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due
to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution
to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be
just to himself.
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action
deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will:
that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and
that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or
injustice towards another.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in
so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms
part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well
or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of
his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does
to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
Article: 4
Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are
not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as
stated above (Article [3]), merit and demerit imply relation to
retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good
or evil, does no good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7):
"If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly,
what shalt thou give Him?" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is
not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit
in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the
instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument
of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence
it is written (Is. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that
cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it
is drawn?" where man while acting is evidently compared to an
instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by
good or evil deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit
through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are
ordained to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit
or demerit in God's sight.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that
are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or
evil." Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak
of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil,
acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
I answer that, A human action, as stated above (Article [3]),
acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else,
either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each
way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight
of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end;
and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated
above (Question [19], Article [10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil
deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as
our last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe,
because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first
of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award
retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community.
Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in
the FP, Question [103], Article [5]: and especially of rational
creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit
or demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions
are no business of God's.
Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses
anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something
from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not
observe the order instituted by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God,
that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was
explained above (Question [9], Article [6], ad 3). Consequently, by his
action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic,
according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that
every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body
politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to
God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires
merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is
concerned.
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TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (Questions [22]-48)
Question: 22 OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in
general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are
four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference
between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and
goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite
rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
Article: 1
Whether any passion is in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul.
Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of
matter and form, as stated in the FP, Question [75], Article [5].
Therefore there is no passion in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys.
iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3.
Therefore passion is not in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since
"every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in
Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in
the soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:5): "When we were in
the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in
our members." Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore
passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First,
in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to
be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper
sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away:
and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is
unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and
loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to
be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And
here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is
said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing
recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to
be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated
that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we
have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas
the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less
excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions
are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of
"feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5).
But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect
of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot
be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the
"composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because
when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of
a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more
properly a passion than joy.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such
a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens
only in those things that are composed of matter and form. But
passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can
be in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not
composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in
respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according
as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima
iii, 4.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in
itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as
stated in De Anima i, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion
accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this
sense, is not found in the soul, except accidentally: but the
composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own
nature.
Article: 2
Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive
part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is
first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in
that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now
passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the
appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there
be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in
the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for
action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active
than the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in
the apprehensive part.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the
power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension.
But passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a
bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the
movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by
some of our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call
{pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv.
5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while
others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them passions." From
this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as
affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not
to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive
rather than in the apprehensive part.
I answer that, As we have already stated (Article [1]) the word
"passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to
the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power
rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through
its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves:
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e.
the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in
itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which
"intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find
it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain
to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is
evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive,
rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case
is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect.
Because in things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to
the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more
active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle
of the exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more
passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves:
since it is through the external action that we come into contact with
things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Question [78],
Article [3] the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First,
by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an
"intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the
sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the object visible,
not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the
organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their
natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or
undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is
accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if
the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome
by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to
the act of the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in
the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural
change of the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of
the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of
passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than
with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a
corporeal organ.
Article: 3
Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the
sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike
instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering
[patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine
things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in
the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the
more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite,
which is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the
object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But
these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]) passion is properly
to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant
being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this
takes place without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on
the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient:
because things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from
petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual
appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive
appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are
ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual
appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but
without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy
angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with
misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is
wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although
they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance
to ours."
Question: 23 HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one
another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any
passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?
Article: 1
Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed
by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part.
Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some
in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mt. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in
species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the FP, Question [81], Article [2]. Therefore,
since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated
above (Question [22], Article [3]), the passions of the irascible
faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in
species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different
powers have different objects, as stated in the FP, Question [77],
Article [3], the passions of different powers must of necessity be
referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of
different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in
the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to
diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the
physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the
potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from
diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those
that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in
genus, while acts and passions regarding different specific objects,
included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the
species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the
irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of
each of these powers. For we have stated in the FP, Question [81],
Article [2], that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible
good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or
pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or
struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some
such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal
nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil,
inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of
the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil
absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy,
sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which
regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or
avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and
the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the FP, Question [81],
Article [2], the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to
remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending
towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or
by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible
passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that
even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by
joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the
irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a
concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to
the irascible power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves
the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
Article: 2
Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (Article [1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the
concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take,
for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same
applies to the irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their
objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there
is no other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is
stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of
passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is
good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety
of passions other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of
approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of
Physics. Now approach results from the apprehension of good;
withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what
all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the
passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of
good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as
stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect
of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not
every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys.
iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions
of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and
evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the
same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone
is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
(Article [1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now
good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto,
since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire
it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun
it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only
of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect
of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every
concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred,
avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible
passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in
respect of the same object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is
sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect
of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or
arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a
tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope";
whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it;
and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the
arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be
shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also
contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous,
whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called
"daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety
in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also
contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Article: 3
Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Article [1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good
or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the
appetitive part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary
to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above (Article [2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion
is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5.
Therefore not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it
cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to
contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is
good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or
difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any
other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained;
which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible
faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the
movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is
contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is
contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Article: 4
Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same
power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one
another. For the passions of the soul differ according to their
objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and
on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore
no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference
of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some
contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same
power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists
in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that
every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above (Article [2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active
causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their
objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two
ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire
differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference
in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the
difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive
power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion,
either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in
drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in
the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to
tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness
on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be
above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the
mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to
rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same
cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place.
The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has,
as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion.
In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a
certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and
this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of
which is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the
aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed
as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil
absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and
"despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and
"daring." But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible
passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something
arduous, as stated above (Article [3]). But evil already present gives
rise to the passion of "anger."
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty
there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and
aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the
irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger
which has not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions
differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in
the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are
contained.
Question: 24 OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the
soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
Article: 1
Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is
morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since
"morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc.
Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common
with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or
evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being
in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]).
Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
"we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are
praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are
not morally good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while
speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is
evil; good if our love is good."
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two
ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command
of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in
themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there
is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as
stated above (Question [18], Article [5]). If, however, they be
considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral
good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer
than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements
and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch
as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so
far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are
said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from
not being checked by the will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves,
are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason,
they are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are
called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort"
(Ethic. i, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does
not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they
are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears
or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry
in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason."
Article: 2
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of
evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the
passions of sins" (Rm. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally
evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all
these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . .
For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin,
they rejoice in good works."
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics
differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all
passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate
passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words,
is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound."
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of
"passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore
they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil
when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero
was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic
theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though
moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be
moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or
passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called
"diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not
controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or
decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart
is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and
hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for
passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as
they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so
far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
Article: 3
Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the
goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of
reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently
decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the
judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take
counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger,
friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a
moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God,
the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers
of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no
anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they
relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore
it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the
soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation
to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by
passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins
deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without
passion, than he who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the
passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without
violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent
forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral
good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul
is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens
the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys
good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed,
if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above (Question [17], Article [7]), it belongs to the perfection of
moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be
controlled by reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will
good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the
perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only
in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite;
according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the
living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual
appetite, and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a
twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and
thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness
of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it
is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of
reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place,
consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance:
because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to
anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the
passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a
sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral
goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the
judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to
work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And
thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no
sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does
not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as
it does in us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes
the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in
either of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the
sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
Article: 4
Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good
or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil
depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so
that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore,
nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from
their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according
to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which
is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not
to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore
no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity
is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7)
that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are
good or evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what
has been said in regard to acts (Question [18], Articles [5],6;
Question [20], Article [1])---viz. that the species of a passion, as
the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view.
First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil
have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly,
according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and
controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the
species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends,
is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the
case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for
another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the
external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in
their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is
considered in itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys
reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the
passions of the appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive
appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led
by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the
Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in
regard to the soul's passions.
Question: 25 OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one
another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
Article: 1
Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede
the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of
their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult
good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible
passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved.
But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to
that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Question [23], Article [1], ad 1;
FP, Question [81], Article [2]). Now "that which removes an obstacle,
is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions
precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible
passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to
cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain."
Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute
good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the
difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the
restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the
irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more
diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the
former we find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and
something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the
irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that
which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest
in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or
arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore,
we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those
concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in
the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such
like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and
hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in
hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz.
sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it follows fear;
since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared:
while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of
self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger.
And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done
to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is
evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a
concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those
concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the
latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty
add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object
of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the
object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain
effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the
arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a
certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the
evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand
between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good
or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or
evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both
arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal
object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the
arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that
which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty
is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible,
as the common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct
but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as
directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion
removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its
object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede
those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads
to the same conclusion.
Article: 2
Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is
a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But
pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of
pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and
consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all
the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the
reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed
first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution.
Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered
either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the
order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place
first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that
whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or
proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end;
secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after
having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the
appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement
towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or
pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire
precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse:
because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is
the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just
as the good itself is, as stated above (Question [11], Article [3], ad
3).
Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for
"words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i,
1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of
love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not
possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we
love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is
felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold.
There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the
other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire.
There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or
proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an
aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love
betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.
Article: 3
Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the
irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from
anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief
characteristic" (cf. Article [2], Objection [1]), it seems that anger
precedes and surpasses hope.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is
something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a
contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to
daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to
strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to
strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger
seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And
consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the
movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply
approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and
daring.
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the
passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible
faculty.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]) all irascible
passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the
irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is
the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love
or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to
sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no
passion in the irascible, as stated above (Question [23], Articles
[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion
or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows
that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of
generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty,
which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil,
those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally
precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that
hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such,
which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;
whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is
consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else,
wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like
manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And
that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from
this---that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so
hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring
arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of
overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while
seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna
observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident
that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in
the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion,
second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire
precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy
precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other
passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from
anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power
takes its name.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good
that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which
regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring
or even anger regards something more arduous.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is
essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object;
its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the
appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the
intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal
of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining
the end.
Article: 4
Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are
not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7]
sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions
of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or
generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in
the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final
passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution
or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore
joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four
principal passions.
Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear
is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be
reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and
daring, from being akin to one another.
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says:
"Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears."
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal
passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal
because in them all the other passions have their completion and end;
wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in
Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they
complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards
the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good,
movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope;
while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and
ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions
in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the
future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to
present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future
good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present
or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have
said that these four are the principal passions, because they are
general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we
understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in
place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz.
some future good.
Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in
the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not
the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that
tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any
further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned
a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be
a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good;
and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement
towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be
principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to
be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,
because it arises from daring.
Question: 26 OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular,
and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of
the irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since
we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3)
Pleasure and sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love
itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?
Article: 1
Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible
power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I
loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible
power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom,
which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the
concupiscible power.
Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every
passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for
the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing
what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is
sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed,
fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.
Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a
"natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural
powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply
in the concupiscible power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power."
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite;
since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to
the difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from
an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in
some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural
things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by
reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of
their nature, as stated in the FP, Question [6], Article [1], ad 2; FP,
Question [103], Article [1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite
arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from
necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the
"sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of
liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite
following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite.
And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the
"will."
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given
to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural
appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's
connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called
"natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre,
is by reason of its weight and may be called "natural love." In like
manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some
good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive
love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is
in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the
intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power,
because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of
difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of
the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the
parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things";
since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is
naturally suitable to it.
Article: 2
Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no
power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as
Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a
passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the
patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient:
for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it
the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the
generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so
that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which
is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be
called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the
appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in
complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the
appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated
in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite,
introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite
moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the
movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in
the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing
else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results
a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of
movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a
principle of movement in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by
reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation
to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself.
Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that
union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a
unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1)
that union is the work of love.
Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement
of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes
that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object,
so as to have complacency therein.
Article: 3
Whether love is the same as dilection?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four
is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of
straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and
dilection denote the same thing.
Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by
reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the
same. Therefore these are the same.
Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems
that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things,
love to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in
reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do
not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that
"it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of
dilection."
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy
men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection
does."
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the
same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,
however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are
expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either
way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For
love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection
or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in
addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very
word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible
power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity
denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far
as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself
implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and
dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus
love is the same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than
the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection
does, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect
of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love
is the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks
of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that
"a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed
love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion,
inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference
spoken of.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when
applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more
Godlike than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion,
especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas
dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for
man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him,
more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which
pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently
love is more Godlike than dilection.
Article: 4
Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided
into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a
passion, while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of
passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of
concupiscence and love of friendship.
Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another
member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same
division as "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same
division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore
concupiscence is not a division of love.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that
which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on
"goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with
friendship.
On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we
desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its
sweetness which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no
friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2.
Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love
is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold
tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or
to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly,
man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to
another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Now the members of this division are related as primary
and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is
loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love
of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for
something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being
simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so,
because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has
goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a
relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that
it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a
thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and
concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence.
For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we
are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or
pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this
respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers
this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that
friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with
love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.
Question: 27 OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?
(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Article: 1
Whether good is the only cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of
love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it
happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good.
Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
"we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that
evil is the cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly
the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [26], Article [1]),
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.
Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its
movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's
object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated
above (Question [26], Articles [1],2), love implies a certain
connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and
to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to
it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the
aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some
respect, and is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain
love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true
good. It is in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by
means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or
money, or such like.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are
beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it
is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes
insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and
they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion
of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the
beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the
most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for
we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to
the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful
odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to
the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases
the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.
Article: 2
Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of
love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are
sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to
have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (Questions
[83], qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek
them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving
something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than
they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but
cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there
would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there
is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not
knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), good is the cause
of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the
appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some
apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher
(Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive
love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or
goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is
the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved
only if known.
Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely
without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some
respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or
from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2).
But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection
of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For
knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish
things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a
fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.
Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know
distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which
regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the
perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in
itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is
known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly
known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they
know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others;
and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of
God.
Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things,
is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Question [26], Article [1]; cf. FP, Question [6], Article [1], ad 2).
Article: 3
Whether likeness is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love.
For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud
there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a
cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a
man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves
an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so,
if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would
love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even
if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves
riches. But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike
them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of
love.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
"we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who
retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like."
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love.
But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One
kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality
actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness
are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing
having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other
has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its
proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper
place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its
act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of
friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike,
having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in
that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and
two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one
tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as
to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of
concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because
whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and
it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive
being.
Now it has been stated above (Question [26], Article [4]),
that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves
himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself
more than another: because he is one with himself substantially,
whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form.
Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the
participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he
loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for
hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel
among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why
"there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one
another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he
loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion:
because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the
former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good
singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion,
inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of
his art.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a
likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of
potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is
liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires.
The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as
compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems
to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men
have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according
to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which
principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being
in conformity with his own natural reason.
Article: 4
Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the
cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are
loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a
passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some
because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every
friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we
have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not
at all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a
cause of love.
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does
not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other
passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest
in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in
something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in
this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other
passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it
may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular
love: just as one good is the cause of another.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure
it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very
pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none
takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love
for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another
thing's being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves
him from whom he receives it.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by
reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of
desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so
intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope
itself is of a good that is loved.
Question: 28 OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)
We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether union is an effect of love?
(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?
(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?
(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
Article: 1
Whether union is an effect of love?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love.
For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with
absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which
is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a
gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is
not an effect of love.
Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to
essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part
to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or
according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does
not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things
essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of
likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (Question [27],
Article [3]). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act,
and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the
lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect
of knowledge rather than of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love."
I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The
first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the
lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be
considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of
the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of
concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind
of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For
when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to
our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love
of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself:
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he
wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's
"other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well
did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love;
because love moves man to desire and seek the presen |
